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This thesis has developed a planning aid to be ussd by
the airborne air defense commander in rhe development cf his
air defense force structure recommenda-cion to the brigade
commander. The planr.ing aid presented is a version of
mulri-attribure utility measurement (MAUM) that provides -he
commander with a simple and understandable means cf organ-
izing multiple inpu-s in selecting equipment. 3y working
through the steps of the model the commander will be
required to rely heavily on use of his judgment; by doing so
he will gain significant insight into the interdependencies
cf the inputs. The WAUM version selected is simple to use
and easy to learn. Its format is also flexible and can be
adapted to all wcrld-wida scenarios. It provides a time-
effective means tor developing a force structure and when
finished will provide the commander with a format that
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I. INTaODUCTION
Airbcrns brigades are designed to deploy rapidly and
efficiently. As part of -^his fast, moving organization, the
air defense commander recommends an air defense force ro
counter the enemy air threat while meeting the constraints
of time and aircraft space.
The selection and recommendation of the optimal package
of air defense equipment is an important function of the
army air defense commander. This thesis develops a tech-
nique to assist the tattery air defense commander in quickly
developing an effective air defense package.
A. DESCBIPTION OF TEE SITOATION
Within the divisions of the U.S. Army there are several
independent battalions that providB numerous combat support
and service support functions (See Figure 1.1). One such
special-purpose battalion is the air defense battalion. An
air defense battalion has four line bat -series and one head-
quarters battery. The four line batteries have the combat
air defense assets necessary to provide the air defense
coverage required to suppor^ the major commands of the divi-
sion (See Figure 1.2). The major commands of the division
are the three infantry brigades, the division support
command (DISCOM) , and the division artillsry (DIVARTY) .
Normally, one line baxtery (A, 3, or C) is allocated to each
of the three infantry brigades. The fourth line battery (D)
supports designated units within the division. The other
independent battalions (signal, armor, engineers, aviation),
normally referred to in the division as the "separate batta-
























































Figure 1.2 Airborne Air Defense Battery.

The ccmmander of a line ba--=ry is part of the brigade
commander's special staff when his line battery is assigned
to the brigade. The battery ccmmander is responsible tc -he
brigade ccmirander for all air defense matters within the
brigade area. This responsibility includes providing
training and conducting educational classes for the officers
and NCO*s of the brigade concerning the air defense unit's
capabilities, limitations, employment techniques, and
requirements, as well as assisting uhe brigade operations
officer with air defense plans for operations (training or
actual) .
The 82d Airborne Division, as part of the Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF), is the Army's most combat ready
division [Ref. 1]. This division cons-cantly maintains a
portion of its combat forces in a state of prepareness tc
meet the RDF contingency mission of deployment. This
prepared force, call=d Division Ready Force (DRF) , has the
missicn cf being able to deploy its first elements within 18
hours cf notification. In order to accomplish this task in
an orderly manner, the DRF is broken down into three smaller
unirs called Division Ready 3at-alions 1, 2, and 3 (DR3-1,
DRB-2, DEB-3). These units are at different stages cf
preparedness for deployment. DRB-1 is the most prepared,
and will be the portion of the DRF tha^. will be airborne in
18 hours. Fart of the deploying force can be made up of
some cf the elements from the separate battalions.
Therefore these units, also identify and partially maintain
part cf their assets in a prepared sxa-e. In the case cf
the air defense battalion this means that one of the four
line batteries has the tactical mission to support the DRF.
This line battery has elements a- various stages of
preparedness with at least one Redeye section (sQ'ven :i-15 1A2
jeeps, 1U personnel and 42 Redeye missiles), and one Vulcan


























Figure 1.4 Redeye Section.
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rigging cpsrations (S€e Figures 1.3 and 1.4). "Iminediar =
rigging epilations" simply means thai all a bartery has re
do is place the designated equipment on haavy-drop plai-
forms, s'xap the equipment to the platforms, attach
parachu-es, and load the "rigged equipment" on the planes
for deplcyment. Later in this section is a description of
the 18 hour sequence the deploying force goes through in
making final preparation for movement.
In -he early stages of the 18 hour sequence, the DHF
commander needs to identify what combat assets will be
needed frcm the separate battalions to support his deplcy-
ment mission. This decision will be based largely on his
concept of the operation (tactical ground plan), his experi-
ence and knowledge of the separate units' combat assets, the
number of aircraft available for movement, and the salesman-
ship of the separate units' commanders.
In this situation the brigade commander is similiar to
the housewife in a grocery store with her limited budget.
The separata battalions' combat assets are items on the
shelf with various prices and functional values, and the
number of cargo airplanes available for movement is the
brigade ccmraander's constraining budget. He can buy
anything that will fit on his airplanes, and no more. Eut,
he does not want to buy just anything. He wants to maximize
his ccmbai ccwer with his limited resources. He wants to
purchase the assets that will best support his operation
plan, and give him the greatest chance of obtaining success.
The question is, what combat assets best support his
operation plan? This is where the air defense battery
commander, along with all the other separate company/troop/
battery commanders, comes into play. Based on the brigade
commander's operation plan (ground tactical plan) and, in
the case cf air defense, his priority list for air defense
13

coverage, the air defense battery comaander makes his reccm-
mendations for the type and number of assets to be included
in -he -ctal force structure. It should be recognized that
each subordinate comaiander' s recommendation of how best to
optimize the brigade force structure will be presented from
a biased poinr of view, it should be expecxed that each
subordinate commander would feel tha' his combat weapons
would contribute more to optimizing the brigade force struc-
ture than -he combat weapons of the other independent
battalions. This recommendation is somewhat lik*^ a commer-
ical in a magazine or on television:
1. The air defense commander is competing with the
subordinate ccmmanders of the other independent
battalions for the brigade commander's limited cargo
space. Each commander has a desired force he would
like to take, but recognizes the fact that the
brigade commander has a constraining factor; thus,
the commanders need to make the brigade commander
aware of the versatility of their weapons.
2. The battery commander's recommendation also presents
the brigade commander with relevant information
concerning the special needs of air defense design
with the intention of making tae brigade commander a
"smarter consumer". The objective is to give the
brigade commander the facts necessary to make his
trade-off decisions concerning combat weapons.
The battery commander's professional skill as a soldier, his
technical knowledge of his air defense equipment, and his
understanding of the deployment situation are the marketing
tools that insure his success. How well organized his
thought process is in developing his recommendation could
make the difference between taking a good air defense
package or taking an air defense package that will fit on




Th€ purpose of this rhssis is to d5velop an evalua-ion
framawcrk or decisior.-malcin g technique to serve the air
defense ccmmander in developing his force structure recom-
mendation; a technique that when implemented will offer the
user flexibility, speed, and organization. The thesis doss
nor directly address the major topics of air threat assess-
ment, equipment performance, weapon sysxem reliability and
other system characxeristic s , or how to evaluate the force's
measure of effectiveness as the result of the battery
commander's recommendation. These are beyond the scope of
this thesis. Rather, the thesis concentrates on how to
organize multiple and sometimes unrelated inputs to develop
a rational recommendation that will provide optimiura results
for the airborne brigade. Only the air defense weapons
assigned to the airborne air defense battery will be consid-
ered in this thesis. These weapons are the towed Vulcan
gun, and the Redeye missile.
C. OBGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter II
introduces the reader to the terminology and doctrine of the
airborne division and the air defense baxtery.
Chapter III provides the reader with a familiarization
of the principles of multi- attribute utility measurement
(MAUM). It also introduces the reader to a version of MAUM
found to be compatible with the objectives of the air
defense iicdel.
Chapter IV explains the format of the air defense model,






This chaptar is included to give the reader a basic
understanding of air defense and airborne topics as seen by
current U. S. Army tactical doctrine. The indent is to
familiarize the reader wirh rhe terminology and some of the
operational meanings of -^he expressions. The majority of
this data was extracted from Army Field Manual (FM) 44-1,
U. S. Army Air Defense Ar-illery Employment, dated 26
February 1979. Additional guidance was obxainad frcm FM
44-3, U. £. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment
Chaparral/Vulcan, dated 30 September 1977.
B. INTEODOCTION TO AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
The mission of tha United States Army is to win a land
battle. To do this, the Army is organized into divisions.
A division is further organized into three brigades, and a
brigade is a grouping of three maneuver battalions.
The brigade conducts two general types of operations.
The first bread *ype is offensive operations.
The primary purpose of offensive operations is to
destroy the integrity of the enemy* s defense by breaking
thrcuan his defensive system and ariving raoidly into
rear areas to destroy artillery, air derense, command
posts, Icaistical support, and command control systems.
CRef. 2] -
t-t- r
The second broad type of operations is called defensive
operations.
The purpose of defensive operations is to cause enough
casualties and destroy enough vehicles to convince the
enemy that his attack is too costlv and should therefore
16

ba disccntinued. From time to time, defensive
operations are conducted to gain time when concentratina
forces elsewhere on the battlefield; to prepare fcrc^s^
facilities, and ins-allat icns; or -o control* essentia 1
terrain. [Ref. 2]
The airborne brigade, lifce a conventional infantry
brigade, ccnducts both type of operations, bat the prepara-
tion phase for the airborne unit is a little different. The
major difference is time allowed for planning and execution.
The airborne brigade achieves its greatest tactical advan-
tage by surprise entry into or near the battlefield.
Surprise means short nctice , limited number of individuals
involved with planning, and rapid movement.
Planning for operations is conducted in great detail.
Four plans are developed for the execution of an airborne
operation: (1) the ground tactical plan, (2) the landing
plan, (3) the air movement plan, and (U ) the marshalling
plan. The plans are developed in reverse order of
execution.
The first plan, the ground tactical plan, includes the
mission cf the force, the sector of operation, location of
the force security element, task organization, fire support
(artillery), and combat service support. The ground
tactical plan is developed from an analysis of the mission,
enemy, terrain, weather, force strength, and duration of the
operation. The ground tactical plan serves as a basis for
the other three plans, and as the origade commander's
guidance to all subordinate commanders.
The landing plan contains the sequence and method of
delivery into the area of operations. The landing plan also
includes how units will assemble, and the assembly aids to
be used by specific units. The landing plan is a used in
developing the marshaling and air movement plans.
17

The three methods of delivery ar a airland, low-al* itad-5
parachu-e extraction system (LAPES) , and parachute drop
(heavy drop). In the airland method, the aircraft lands,
the equipment drives off -.^hile the aircraft engines ara
running, and then the aircraft rakes off. The airland
method insures minimum damage to equipment; delivers vehi-
cles ready for immediate drive-away; delivers crews with
their weapons and vehicles; and provides for *he return of
casualties, prisoners of war, and damaged equipment.
With low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAFES)
the aircraft slows down, flies five to ten meters off the
ground, and drcps a parachute out the rear of the airplane.
The parachute inflates and pulls the equipment out. The
parachute offers no air support to the load; it is just a
means of extracting the equipment from the plane. LAPES
requires less preparation time, fewer personnel, and less
equipment support than heavy drop. LAPES is a pinpoint
delivery system for combat equipment (e.g. Sheridan tank);
however equipment is more susceptible to damage with LAFES
than with airland.
The third .uethod is parachute drop. This method
requires more preparation time, more personnel, and more
support equipment than does LAFES, Leads are strapped to a
metal platform referred to as a heavy irop platform. The
platform is adjustable in length and is usually just long
enough to cover the base of the load. Then two or three
cargo parachutes are attached to the load. The number of
parachutes depends on the weight of cargo. While airplane
flies at a reduced speed (130 knots), and at an altitude of
800 feet above ground level (AGL) , the parachute pulls the
equipment out the rear and supports the load to the ground.
Equipment is even more susceptible to damage with heavy drop
than with LAPES, and this delivery method is net as accurate
as the above two. Variables such as wind speed and pilot
error play a major role in the accuracy of this method.
18

The air movement plan specifies aircraft leads. It
includes a schedule for loading of aircraft, and the rou-^s
to be used in moving the prepared equipment and personnel
from rigging areas tc the planes.
The marshaling plan provides the details necessary to
assemble personnel, equipment, and supplies to be smployed
in the deployment mission. It provides a schedule for the
completion cf major events in preparation phase such as
preparation cf equipment, rigging of squipment, movement of
loads, and pre-flight inspections of loads.
C- AIB DEFENSE DOCTBIHE
Army air defense doctrine consists of the principles cf
operations, organization, and tactics rsquir^d to fight an
air battle. These principles provide for the employment cf
a mix of co irplementary weapon systems to counter the various
air threats used by the enemy. Th= (J. S. Army weapons for
air defense are divided into two categories:
1. Low altitude, short-range air defense (SHOHAD). This
category cf air defense weapon systems includes the
Vulcan gun. Chaparral missile, and the man-portable
air defense system Redeye missile.
2. High and medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) . Within
this category of air defense assets are the
Nike-Hercules missile and the Improved Hawk.
These categories are based on the altitudes at which
most aerial engagements by the weapon system would ncrmally
take place. Most SHCEAD engagements will take place below
5000 feet above ground level (ASL), and at ranges less than
5km. With the HIMAD systems, the engagements are normally
above 5000 feet AGL , and at ranges to 140 km. HIMAD systems
have the capability of engaging targets at lower altitudes
and shorter ranges, but their mission is to engage the
19

hostile force at maximum distances. This allows for
follow-cn shots if necessary.
SHORAE systems are normally employed in support cf mane-
uvar elanien~s to defend their critical assets against atiack
by close support aircraft and helicoptsrs. SHORAD systems
must be capable of moving with the force they support. (A
battalion-size element is normally referred to as a maneuver
element)
.
HIMAD systems are deployed with a division-size or
larger unit. Longer range air defense missile systems
provide area coverage; these systems have more equipment
than SHOFAD systems, and therefore require more time to move
and set up. These systems are not designed to be delivered
by heavy drop or LAPES from airplanes.
In most army divisions, these air defense systems would
be integrated with friendly fighter aircraft into an overall
air defense design. The fighter aircraft would strike the
enemy aircraft well forward of the friendly force (a
distance cf approximately 10-15 km) to effect maximum attri-
tion, and to break up concentrated attack formations. This
tactic removes some cf the organization and smoothness cf
the enemy's attack techniques, and adds to his uncertainty
(e.g., more concern for his fuel reserve or possible damage
to his plane). This also presents to the enemy a continual
air defense threat throughout the friendly's engagement
zcne.
D. CCMMiND AND CONTFOL
Normally the senior air force officer in the area is the
overall air defense ccmmander. His title will vary
depending on the size of the organization he is charge cf
,
but he usually will be called the region air defense
ccmmander, cr the area air defense commander in an unified
20

or join- command. Within tha division, zhe senior air
defense ccmmander is the battalion commander of ths air
defense battalion. The oattalion commander coordinates his
activities with the area air defense commander.
Engagements of air defense weapons are ccnt.rolled by the
area air defense commander through the establishment of air
defense rules and procedures. Tha authority to order an air
defense engagement is regained at the hignest unit able to
effectively control the air battle. For Hercules and Hawk,
this is usually battalion level, for Vulcan it is normally
the battery level, and for a Redeya taam it could be the
enlisted team leader in charge of the team.
The rules and procedures include the following:
1. Rules of Engagement. These are directives from the
ar=a air defense commander that are included in all
tactical standard operating procedures (TSOP) of each
unit having an air defense mission or air defense
capability. Briefly, they outline general hostile
criteria, and airspace/geographical control direc-
tives. They also state in clear, diract language
that the right of self-dafensa is always preserved.
2. Hostile Criteria. This is the means the air defense
units use to designate a target as friendly or
hostile . This can be elactrcnic devices, such as
IFF, or visual techniques. Visual criteria can be
positive identification of the aircraft. Other
visual criteria that classify an aircraft as hostile
could be aircraft attacking friendly troops, or
aircraft dropping unauthorizad substances.
3. Weapons Control. Eased on the air situation, the
area air defense ccmmander can impose varying degrees
of control on air defense systams. Lower commanders
may impose a more restrictive control on organic
equipment, but must raquest the area air defense
21

ccmmander to change to a Isss restrictive weapon
control. Commcnly used terms are "weapons frss":
weapons may fire at. any aircraft not postiviely iden-
tified as friendly; "weapons tight"; fire only at
aircraft positively identified as hostile; and
"weapons hold": do not fire except in self defense.
U. Firing Commands. These are commands issued regard-
less of the weapons control in effect. There are
three commonly used terms. The first of the three is
"hold fire": this command is used to protect
specific friendly aircraft. The second is "cease
fire". Cease fire is the command used to prevent
simultaneous engagements of a target. The third
command is "csase engagement". Cease engagement is
the command used to prepare the firing unit to engage
a higher priority target. If rounds are not already
in flight, the engagement sequence is stopped and the
firing unit prepares tc engage the new target. If
rounds or missile are already launched, the firing
unit continues with its prssent engagement until the
rounds or missile intercept the target; then it
prepares to engage the new target.
E. AIR DEFENS2 MISSION
In general t9rms, the air defense objective is tc limit
the effectiveness of enemy offensive air efforts. Air
defenses are those actions required to nullify or reduce an
enemy's capability tc use airspace to attack friendly
forces. The ultimate goal of air defense units is to
protect friendly forces from an enemy aircraft or missile
attack, to allow freedom of use of the airspace for friendly




F. aiB DEFENSE TACTICAL MISSIONS
Eiisfly, there are four tactical missions that can ts
assigned -co an air defense commander. The first is gen<=ral
support <GS) . An air defense commandsr that recieves a GS
mission will provide air defense for the force as a whole.
The ccmraander supports the entire force, and is not
committid to any specific element of the force. The air
defense ccmiander coordinates, develops, and implements his
air defense design and is responsible for positioning his
weapons systems.
The second tactical mission is that of general'
supporting-reinforcing (GSR). The air defense commander
provides air defense for the force as a whole, and augments
the coverage of another air defense unit. GSR units are not
committed to any specific element of the force. Positioning
of his units may have to be coordinated with the air defense
unit he is augmenting.
The third tactical mission is reinforcing (R) . The air
defense commander's primary mission is to augment the
coverage of another air defense unit. The reinforcing
commander is the subordinate commander, and coordinates the
deployment and positioning of his weapons with the rein-
forced ccmmander. The reinforcing commander establishes
liaison and communications with the reinforced unit.
The fourth tactical mission is direct support (DS) . The
air defense commander with a DS mission provides dedicated
air defense for a designated maneuver unit within the force,
and coordinates his movements with the element he supports.
The air defense commander positions his weapons to properly
support the operations of the supported element.
23

G. AIR DEFENSE PRIOHITIES
There will always be mora nseds for air defense in an
area cf operation than there ar= air defense resources to
protect them. On developing a lisz of pricri-nies for air
defense, the force (brigade) commander and the air defense
commander should consider the fallowing:
1. Vulnerabiliry . How well can an asset survive an
attack?
2. Criticali^y. How critical is zhe asset to -he
(Diss ion?
3. Recuperabilit y. If the asset is attacked, how
quickly can damage be repaired?
4. Enemy air threat. What is the enemy's capability to
attack the asset?
5. Relocation. Can assets be regrouped to result in
fewer separate assets?
H. TACTICAL PEINCIPIZS
There are four fundamental principles cf employment
which form the basis for accomplishing the air defense
objective. The first of these is weapon mass. Mass is the
allocation cf a sufficient amount of air defense resources
to adequately defend the brigade commander's priority
assets. In this situation, 'more is better'.
The second principle is weapon mix. Mix is the employ-
ment cf air defense weapon systems with different
characteristics and capabilities. An example of air defense
mix for an airborne infantry brigade would be a defense that
includes the Vulcan gun and the Redeye missile. The intent
is for thfc Redeye to complement the weaknesses of the
Vulcan, and the Vulcan to complement the weaknesses of the
Redeye.
The third principle is mobility. Air defense units must
be able tc move, and move at the same speed as the maneuver
element, if they are to provide the unit with continuous air
24

defense coverage. Motility also increases the air defer.se
units' chances of survival.
The final principle is that of integration. This
simply nieans that the air defense design must be integrated
into the overall plan of the brigade to be effective. That
is, all subordinate units of the brigade must be working in
unison tc\<ards a commcn goal.
I. DESCEIP1I0N OF SHORAD WEAPONS
Rudclf Walter commented:
...low level flying is used increasingly bv our own
and enemy air forces. This trend to move strike opera-
tions to altitude ranges between 30 meters and 300
meters is clearly demonstrated by technical and cpera-
ticnal concepts embodied in the F- 1 1 1 , Tornado, the
SU-19, A- 10, and the SU-25, as wall as by the increasing
imDortance of the helicopter on the batt.lefield
.
[aef. 3]
As a result of this trend to lower altitude of
attack aircraft, greater emphasis has been placed on low-
altitude, short-range air defense systems. This thesis will
focus only en low-altitude, short-range (SHORAD) weapons,
and only those weapons organic to the airborne division.
The first system is the Vulcan.
The Vulcan is a mcbila air defense gun system used to
counter the low-altitude air threat. It is effective
against both high-performance aircraft and slower fixed-wing
aircraft and helicopters at ranges out to 1200 meters.
Vulcan can also provide effective ground fire against
personnel, weapons, and thin-skinned vehicles to a range of
about 2 00 meters.
As pointed out by Lieutenant Colonel Frankcski:
The antiaircraft (AA) gun has been proved one of the
most valuable and flexible battlefield resources avai-
lable to the ground commander. Ground commanders who
have such weapons and trained units at their disposal
25

hav€ -he rssourcss to substi-ute for or reinforce Their
field artillery, ccast defense, and antitank forces.
[Ref. 4]
The towed Vulcan gun system consists of an .^-168
cannon mcunxed on an M-4 2 gun carriage. The prime mover is
usually an M-56 1 Gamma Goat. Maximum speed whil= -owing the
Vulcan is 45 mph on improved roads.
The ccmpairaxively light weigh- of -he towed Vulcan (3 150
pounds) permits its use in support of airborne operations.
Emplacement time for the towed Vulcan is about five tc ten
minutes. Reaction time, -he -ime between acquisition of
target and firing on target, is aoout -en seconds.
The Vulcan is a six-barrel 20 !1J1 Gatiing-type gun that
has a low-firing rate of 10 00 rounds per minute and a high-
firing rate of 3000 rounds per minute. Using a firing rate
switch, the Vulcan may be fired a- the high rate in bursts
of 10, 30, 60, and 100 rounds. Its onboard range-only radar
(ROR) provides ranging information for "^he firs control
system. Th9 cannon can be transversed 360 degrees in
azimuth ai^d elevated between degrees and 80 degrees.
Although equipped with a night sight for ground fire
support, the Vulcan is a f a ir- weather , daylight air defanse
system with a maximum effective range against aerial -^argets
of abcut 1200 meters.
Vulcan normally uses air dafsnse, incendiary tracer,
self -dsstruct ammunition (HEIT-SD). Approximately 500
rounds of ready-to- fire ammunition ara carried on the
weapon. Reload time is less than three minutes. Another
3500 rounds, which ccmplates the basic load of UOOO rounds,
are carried on the prime mover.
Mutual support, the tactic of placing a weapon within
the engagement capabilities of at laast one adjacent systara,
is accomplished by positioning a Vulcan within 1000 meters
26

of ancthcr Vulcar.. As a rasult of this posi-ioning r=5quir=-
a^r.z , Vulcans are norirally dsployei in pairs or in platoon
strength units on or around ths asss- being defended.
Vulcan's lajor szeng-h is its iual capability agains-
air or surface targets. Jlajor limitations of the Vulcan
include its lack of armor protection, dependence en the
M-56 1 for mobility, limited ammunition load, and limited
range for a?rial targets.
The ether air defense weapon organic tc the airborne
division is the Redeye missile. Redeye is a man-pcrtaale,
shoulder'fired, air defense, infrared-seeking, guided
missile system that is normally deployed in teams of two
individuals each. It has an effective range of about 3000
meters. Engagement ranges and sf f5Ct iveness are dependent
on such factors as the speed, size, aspect, and altitude cf
the target. Reaction time for this system is about ten
seconds.
The team's prime mover is an M- 1 5 1 jeep. The vehicle
carries the team's basic load of six rounds, the team's
combat communication equipment, and the team's two
personnel.
The Redeye weapon is also a fair-weather, daylight air
defense system. The weapon has no capability to engage
ground targets, and contributes little to night perimeter
security.
Mutual support for a Redeye taam is accomplished by
positioning a Redeye team within 2400 meters of another
team. Tc insure early engagement of the target, Redey=
teams are usually placed away from the critical asset. This
positioning requirement provides the brigade area with more
of an area air defense coverage. This same requirement also
makss the team more vulnerable to enemy ground fire. The
Redeye team normally operates one Redeye missile at a time.
While the gunner is preparing the missile, the team leader
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is supervising ths gunner and scanning the skies for
targets. The team leader is also a qualified gunner; -here-
fore, the team has the potential of launching two missiles
simultaneously.
Redeye's major strengths are its light weight and easy
deployment capability. Major limitations of Redeye include
the "smoke signature" of the weapon when fired, the "tail-
chase" nature of the weapon, and the limited possibilities
for multiple firings at a given target. The smoke signature
of the weapon is a smoke trail the weapon leaves as it moves
from the launch area to the target. Other targets m the
area can use this trail as a means of locating and directing
suppressive fire on the Redeye team's position. The tail-
chase nature of the weapon has to do with the weapon's
infrared-seeking device. Most high performance aircrafts'
engines emit their exhaust towards the rear of the plane.
The Redeye weapon seeks the hottest araa of this exhaust
which ncrmally is the rear edge of the engine. As a result
the missil= tends to fly along a curved path ending with the
missile "chasing" the target from behind. This tail-chase
nature of the Redeye has two possible weaknesses. The first
is that fcr a target to be engaged by Redeye it must have
already passed the Redeye's position and be moving into the
asset area -^o deliver the aircraft's ordnance. The seccnd
pcssible weakness is the result of technological develop-
ments; some aircraft can simply outrun the Redeye missile.
The limited possibilities for multiple firings is the
function of the number of members on the team (two), and the
time required to place a Redeye missile into operation (ten
seconds). Normally, the maximum number of firings per
target will be two.
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J. DESCRIPTION OF 1 8-HOOR SEQUENCE
The 18-hour ssquenca is a prsdstermined order of events
that insures the deploying force conducts its preparaticn
phrase in an effective and complete fashion. How well The
personnel of the deploying force understands the sequence
will determine partly how efficient the unit is in its
deployment.
The material for this section was extracted from -he
Readiness Standard Operating Procedure (RSOP) of the 82d
airborne Division dated February 1981.
The 18-hour sequence starts by notifying the deploying
unit of its mission. The time of notification is called
N-hcur. The standard operating procedure for -he 18-hcur
sequence is:
N^hour
1. Unit recieves notification massage of exercise.
2. Unit starts orocedures necessary to notify all
Dsrscnnel of " the unit -o return to their place of
^uty. This is normally called "recall procedures".
N+1:00
1. Qnit continues to assemble personnel.
N+2:00
1. Brigade commander briefs his subordinate commanders
en the upcoming exercise .(this is normally called a
warning order or a tentative around plan). At this
point there are still many unanswered questions.
N+2:30
1. The rigging arsa is opened. At this time the exact
equipment has not been designatad for the exercise,
but the personnel at the rigging site can start some
preliminary pr=paration. These preDaraticns could
include assembling platforms, cutting materials
necessary to secure equipment to the platforms, and
drawina parachutes from storage warehouses.
N+4:30
1, Brigade commander briefs his selected around tactical
plan,
a^c:
.y u= (-. i-ui luaijucj. uj.^'si.s uj-o o *2i :su.i,<su. u^uuiiu ^ >-._ v^a .
.n. At this point the brigade commander will have
;ided who is going, and what equipment is going.





1. Th€ designated equipment begins to move to the
riaging area where it will oe prepared for airland,
LAfnS, or heavy drop,
N+S: 00
1. Unit p<=rsonnel draw parachu-es. Personnel prepare
their individual weapon and equipment for the
upcoiing jump. This includes taping loose siraos,
packing eauipment, and rigging equipmen" so that it
can be attached to the jumper for -ne jump.
^±10:00
1. First increment of the combat, equipment (airland,
LAPES, or heavy dropi is moved from xhe riaging area
t.0 the aircraf" parking area. The prepared equipment
is loaded as flanes are made availaole by Air Force
personnel
.
N +2 6 : 30
1. All rigged combat equipment for -he deploying force
is leaded.
2. Unit personnel start -he process of putting on their
individual parachutes and' rigged individual equip-
ment.
N+27:30
1. All personnel are properly rigged with their para-
chutes and ready to be loaded.
2. Personnel are loaded on their designated airplanes.
N+28:00
1. First airplane is airborne followed at 30 seconds or
prescribed intervals until the deploying force has
all taken off.
As with all SOPs in the U. S. Army, these are guidslines
to be used to increase the smoothness of -he ongoing event.
There may be occasions where -he guidelines must be modified
to accomodate the current, mission. The division commander,
in this sit.uation, is the individual that will approve all
changes to the SOP. Unless a change has beer, approved by




III. MOLTIj^ATTEIBOTE UTILITY HEASOREMENT (MAOM)
The purpose of zh±s chapter is to expound en ihree
areas. The first area will direct the reader to a few cf
the works that emphasize the advantages of having a judg-
mental !!icdel assist a decision maker in developing his plan
of action. Many of the advantages or objectives cf the
judgmental models are desirable features for a model for
selecting equipment for air defense purposes. The objec-
tives that coincide will be covered in some detail in the
text, and then explicitly restated at the end of the
section.
The second area will provide a brief, informal explana-
tion of multi-attribute utility measurement (MAUil) intended
to familiarize the reader with the basic procedures. There
are many versions of ^AUfl in use today. while all are based
on the same basic ideas, the details of iraple mentation vary
from one tc another. Due to the numerous variations a
detailed explanation of each version of ilAUM is net feasi-
bile here.
In the third area, the version of MAUM selected for this
thesis will be explained in mora detail. The version
selected for this thesis, Edwards' 10 Step MAUM called
"SMART", is a 'quick and dirty* variant of the technique.
As Gardiner and Edwards say, it.
...is oriented not toward mathematical soohistication
or intimacy of relation between under lying* formal struc-
tures and the practical procedures that implement them
but rather toward easy communication and use in environ-
ments in which time is short and decis:.on makers are
busy. [Ref. 5 ]
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Edwards and Nawmann [Ref. 6], introduced SMART in 1980.
This version of SMAET is a modification of earlier techni-
ques introduced by Edwards in 1971 and 1979.
Edwards' approach was selected for the following
reasons: (1) it has the great advantage of being easily
taught 10 and used by a busy decision maker; (2) its frame-
work applies to most MAUM procedures; (3) it meets the six
characteristics Little [ Ref . 7], states are necessary for a
model -0 be useful ic management. According to Little a
model should be simple and easy to understand; a mcdel
should be easy to communicate with; a model should be rcbus"
(an user should find it hard to make the model give bad
answers) ; a model should be easy to control (behave the way
the user wants it to); a model should be adaptive (easy to
update) ; a irodel should be complete on important issues
(optimal level cf detail) . According to Little,
...an important aid to completeness is the incorpora-
tion of subjective judgment. [Ref. 7].
But why dees an air defense commander (especially a battery
commander) need a model? This point will be examined first,
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE AIR DEFENSE MODEL
The purpose of this section is to discuss those objec-
tives of modelling that are to be included as objectives cf
the air defense model. These objectives are:
1. To develop a planning model for organizing thoughts;
a framework that, once completed, will assist the ai:
defense commander in communicating his recommenda-
tions to his superior.




3. Tc develop a model tha-;: can be adapted to various
situations.
4. Tc develop a model that is simple and unders- an dabls.
This thesis is developed on the premise -hat a mcdsl
which includes the interaction of the individual's judgment
as part of the model system will produce results which are
superior to the situations where (1) the individual relies
solely en his intuition (based on military judgment or
experience) , or (2) the individual relies on statistics as a
means of predicting, or (3) the individual relies on the
processes of a model alone. As Holt concluded:
...a search of the literature fails to reveal any
studies in which clinical judaraent alone has been shown
to be suDerior to statistical prediction when both are
bascd on" the same ccdable input variables. [Ref. 8].
The subject of intuition alone versus model-plus-
judgment has received much emphasis in recent years. This
section will review some of the arguments. The intent is
not tc cover or summarize the entire works of the many
authors en either side. An interested reader who desires
the benefits of an elaborate discussion is encouraged tc
start with Paul Meehl's book [Hef. 9], or Dawes' article
[Ref. 10]. These references will direct the interested
reader to numerous other =rticle3 and books written on the
subject.
In his study of organization, Sdeiman [Ref. 11] provides
an interesting comparison of the quality of managerial deci-
sions in a competitive bidding situation, with and without
the use of a judgment-based model. In seven tests,
mana gers-plus- model wen the bid, wnile managers alone won
only three. The model used was extremely simple and did
little mere than assist the managers' own estimating proce-
dures. It provided organization to a time constrained and
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unszruc-ured procsss. It was assumed by Edslman that in
situations vihere time management vras critical, managers
without the model tended to overloolc some important a3p=5C-3
of bidding, whereas those wiih the model had an established
procedure to follow. This established procedure assisted in
preventing accidental oversights, and in zhe long run
provided -he decision malcer with better estimates. This is
one of the objectives to be included in the air defense
model: to develop a planning tool for organizing thoughts.
This model will assist the battery commander in organizing
his estimates (to make the most use of his time). By
working through the steps, the air defense model will serve
as a checklist, a memory aid to insure he will not overlook
an important planning element in his severe time limitation.
The air defense model will also be a support document which
the ccmmander will use as a reference in presanting his
ideas in an orderly fashion.
Another study, dene by Little [Sef. 7] in 1975, resulted
in th= design of the Erandaid system. The Brandaid system
is an interactive Decision Support System (DSS) that
supports the decision process in commercial marketir.g, plan-
ning, and estimating overall profitability. The main
feature of the Brandaid system is its emphasis on the role
of judgment in the decision process. Little found that
managers generally have a good understanding of the dynamics
of the market, or at least of the interrelationship among
its compcnents, taken in pairs. But they are not capable of
determining the full interactions of different components
simultaneously. According to Little, by forcing a quantita-
tive technique, Brandaid encourages managers to become more
explicit and analytic in their problem solving, but it still
strongly relies upon their experiences, knowledge base, and
personalized judgment. This highlights another objective to
be included in the air defense model: to develop a tool for
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analysis that emphasizes the role of judgment in decision
making. The air defense model will encourage commanders (by
working through rhe steps of the model) to become more
analytic in their prcblem-solving abilities. It is a model
tha- will rely heavily upon the air defense commanders
experencies, judgment base, and military intuition for the
final decisions.
The air defense model assumes that the air defense
commander will have a good understanding of the principles
of air defense, but he may require some assistance in
comprehending the many interrelationships among them. By
working through the steps of the model, the commander will
be forcsd to analyze the interdependencies of the princi-
ples, to exercise his judgment base as to what principli=s
are or are not important, and to place a value on the prin-
ciples in the current situation.
The air defense mcdel will also allow the commander
flexibility in the choice of input parameters. This is
necessary to insure that the model will be adaptable so as
to handle all the various world-wide scenarios. Dawes
concluded that, although models in general are better at
integrating information.
...the model cannot replace the exoert in deciding such
things as "what to look" for." People are important.
The model may integrate the information in an optimal
manner, but it is always the individual who chooses
variables. Moreover, it is the human iudge wno knows
the directional relationship between tne prediction
variables (attributes) , or who can code the variables in
such a wav that they nave clear directional relation-
ships. [Ref. 10].
Dawes also concluded that:
PeoDle ars...models work for a very simple reason. __
good at picking out the right predictor variables and at
coding them in such a way that they have a conditionally
monotone relationship with the criterion. People are
bad at integrating information from diverse ana incompa-




Ths final objective of the air defense model is suamar-
ized very precisely by Johnson
...a decision model needs to be uncomplicated and easy
to understand-simple. [Ref. 12].
Edwards puts a great amount of emphasis on the simplicity of
his technique [Ref. 13]. While this method may lack the
theoretical elegance of techniques proposed by Raiffa
[Ref. 14] or Keeney [Ref. 15], it has the great advantage of
being easily learned and used by a busy battery commander.
Barthclomew concludes that:
...indeed a simple model is often more effective in the
sense its results may be more likely to be heeded siiply
because manageinent find it easier to understand and
therefore more acceptable. [Ref. 16]
Keen [Ref. 17] describes a desired managerial decision
model as being:
...very simple and crude, rather than mathematically
sophisticate!. It is often based on heuristic rules and
standard procedures for analysis.
Summarizing the above comments: a model should provide
a forirat for organizing ideas; a model should allow for the
maximum use of judgment; a model should encourage a more
analytic analysis; a model should be flexible; and a model
should be simple to understand. The results of a judgmental
model are mere likely to oe used and understood by manage-
ment, and to be more reliable than intuition.
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B. THE EASICS OF MADM
As Peter C. Gardiner said
Th 9 9S
any of
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Eut a little differently, each alternative (referred
to as cutcome in the above) may have value on a number cf
different attributes (referred to as dimensions in the
above). Ihe MAUM technique, in any version, is to discover
those values, on? attribute a- a time, and then to aggregate
tham using a suitable rule and weighting procedure.
Probably the simplest and the most widely used aggregation
rule and weighting procedure consists of simply taking a
weighted linear average; this is the only procedure that
will be discussed in this thesis. (Readers are encouraged
to read Edwards [Ref. 19] for a broader coverage of the
subject) . According to Edwards
...taecry, siaulaticn computations, and experience all
suggest tnat weighted linear average yield extremely
close approximations to very much more complicated
nonlinear and interactive functions, waile remaining far
easier to elicit and understand. [flef. 20].
So, what are the basics? Simply stated they are:
1. Identify the decision maker.
2. Identify the purpose of the decision.
3. Identify the alternatives for the problem.
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4. Id€n-:ify the attributes of interest for the parti-
cular problem, Edwards' [Ref. 20] rul^ of thumb is
that eight attributes is plenty and fifteen attri-
butes is too many.
5. Rank the attributes from most important to least
important.
6. Rate the attributes in importance.
7. Measure or estimate the alternatives of interest one
attribute at a time.
8. Sum the measures assigned to each alternative.
9. Decide.
C. SIMPLE MOLTIATTRIBDTE RATING TECHNIQOE (SMART)
This version of Edwards* MAUM was extracted from
Gardiner's article [ Ref . 5]. This implementation emphasizes
simplicity.
Stepl. Identify the persons wnose utilities are to be
maximized-the st alcehclders. A stakeholder is simply an
individual with a reason to care about the decision, and
with enought impact on the decision maker so that the reason
should be taken seriously. The basic question here is
"Whose Utility?" In the air defense problem, the brigade
commander is the only stakeholder considered. The air
defense battery commander, the decision maker, develops a
recommendation in expectation of optimizing the brigade
commander's combat capability.
Step 2. Identify the reason for the decision. For what
purpose is the evaluation being made? What is the reason
for assessing the decision maker's preferences? For the air
defense problem, the reason the decision is being made is to
optimize the brigade's combat force and thus increase
brigade's likelihood cf success with its mission.
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step 3. Identify the alriernativss to be evaluated. In
the air defense model to be discussed in Ckap-er IV, thare
will te nc mere -han three alternatives. These alternatives
could include all Vulcans, all Redeyes, or a combination of
the two weapon systems. The actual quantifies for each
weapon alternative will be sta-ed at the start (e.g. six
Vulcans versus six Redeyes versus three Vulcans and three
Redeyes). This way the resul- of the aggregrated rule will
represent a measure cf effectiveness (MOE) for each alt-erna-
tive. The commander will then have a means for comparing
the alternatives.
Step a. Identify the relevant dimensions cr atrributas.
What attributes are important to the evaluation of the
alternatives for this particular scenerio? As was mentioned
in the last section, the number of attributes should be kept
to a minimum (eight was recommended). It is important not
to be too expansive at this stage. The number of attri-
butes shculd be kept down for reasons that will be apparent
shortly. This can often be done by restating and combining
attributes. It can be done also by simply omitting the less
important ones. The intent is not to evolve a complete
list. The attributes for the air defense model will be
considered in Chapter IV,
Step 5. Rank the attributes in order of importance. In
the air defense irodel, for example, a commander working in a
heavily weeded area might consider the effects of terrain
and vegetation more important on his air defense design
than, maybe, logistics or vulnerability of weapons.
Step 6. Rate attributes in importance, preserving
ratios. To do this, start by assigning the least-important
attribute an impcrtance of 10. Now consider the
next-least-important attribute. How much more important (if
at all, the model allows for ties) is it than the least-
important? Assign this attribute a number that reflects
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tha- ra*io. Continue on up the lis-, checking each set of
implied ratios as each new judgment is made. Thus, if an
at-tribure is assigned a weigh- of 10 while another is
assigned a weig-ht of 80, it means that the 80 attribute is
eight times as important as the 10 attribute, and so on. By
-he time xh = las* attribute is reached, there will be many
checks to perform to insure that the implied ratios reflect
what the decison maker in"::9nded. Typically, decision makers
will want to revise previous judgments -co make them consis-
tent wi'h present ones. This szep in the air defense mcdel
is wher* the model fcrces the air iefense commander to
conduct an informal analysis. Each attribute, (eg.,
terrain) ixs importance to the scenario, irs importance to
overall mission accomplishment, and its importance relative
to the other attributes needs to be considered. Here is
where the commander's experience and judgment come into
play.
Step 7. Sum the importance weights, divide each by the
sum, and multiply by 100. This gives each attribute an
importance rating between and 103 such that the sum of the
ratings =quals 100. Ihis step is purely computational. The
choice 3f a O-to-100 scale is arbitrary. At this step the
folly of including too many attributes in Step U becomes
very obvious. If 100 points ar9 to be distributed over a
set of attributes, and some attributes are more important
than ethers, then the less important attributes will have
significant weights cnly if there are a limited number of
them. Again Edwards' rule of thumb is that eight attributes
are plenty and fifteen attributes are too many.
Step 8. Measure the location of each alternative being
evaluated on each dimension (attribute) . This measuring of
the location of an alternative for each attribute is
commonly referred to in the literature as developing an
utility function. The discussion of utility theory (or
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develop ment of utility function) will not be covered in -his
thesis. An interested reader could s-art his study by
reading Keaney and Raiffa. [Ref. 21]
The technique of utility theory used in SMART is called
direct assessmen- of utilities by Keenly and Raiffa
[Ref. 21]. It is called direct assessment since it requires
a subjective input from the decision maker for each measure-
ment. It assumes, with the completion of Step 4, that the
decision maker realizes the reason for assessing his prefer-
ences (or developing the numeric measure given for each
alternative) and is sufficiently motivated to think hard
about his feelings for the various alternatives. It must be
understood there are no objectively correct preferences, the
measurements represent the subjective feelings of the deci-
sion maker. If, at any time, the decision maker feels
uncomfortable with any of the measurements, it is perfectly
correct for bi.m to adjust them. It is also assumed that
each cf the alternatives can be adequately described in
terms of each of the attributes. The measurement scale
recommended by Edwards [Ref. 20] is a straight line proce-
dure. The decision maker associates with each alternative a
real number on the scale cf O-to-13 that indicates his
subjective appraisal (or estimate) of th= position on that
attribute. The orientation cf the scale is crucial to the
decision maker: Are higher numbers more or less desirable?
In the air defense problem higher numbers are more desirable
than lower numbers (that is, more is better than less
throughout the range of the attribute)
.
Edwards* recommendations also include limiting the
measurement region to a small and reasonable area. This
limitation was done for convenience more than anything else,
but Keeney and Raiffa [Ref. 21 ] point out that this range
needs to be meaningful to the decision maker. They reccm-
mend along with bounding the region that the decision maker
U1

set the utility for two of the altsrna-ives and evaluate the
ether alt'irr.at iv9s in terms of the first two. For sxampls,
"X" alternative is mere preferred than all the other alter-
natives, so "X" is given a ten. "Y" alternative is the
least preferred alternative and is given zero. The
remaining alternatives ara then assessad (or measured) rela-
tive to these two. The advantage of this option (referred
to later as the two fixed end option) is that the user nesds
to spend little time deciding on what utility (or measure-
ment) to give to each alternative for each attribute. For a
given attribute, the decision maker informally ranks the
alternatives from best to worst. The best is measured ten,
the worst is measured zero, and th= middle alternative or
alternatives are measured relative to tha two established
end points. This option gives the user swift and prompt
measurements.
The disadvantage with this option is the rigidity of the
measurement procedure. The decision maker gains speed, but
forfeits the flexibility of developing measurements commen-
surate with alternative's rslative worth. That is, he loses
the ability to consider the explicit tradeoffs between
alternatives. Various options exist which allow the deci-
sion maker to trade speed for time. One such option is to
fix one =nd point of the measurement ragion, the upper end
point (in Chapter IV this is called the single fixed
option). The best altenative is measured ten, and the
remaining alternatives are measured relative to the best.
The lower end point, zero utility, is assigned to an imag-
inery or theoretical alternative that contributes
(practically) nothing to this attribute; it may be that all
the actual alternatives have scores greater than zero. The
advantage here is flexibility in developing measurements
commensurate to the alternative's relative worth. The deci-
sion maker gains the opportunity to consider the tradeoffs
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between alternatives in nia)cing his measurements decisions.
This cp-cicn is slower to use than rhe two fixed end point
option, but the disadvantage of the rigidity of the measure-
nent procedure is also less.
Another option is to assign neither end point to any of
the actual alternatives. The decision maker must now
imagine a (practically) worthless alternative and assign it
a score of zero, as above, and he must also imagine a (prac-
tically) perfect alternative and assign it a score of ten.
Then all actual alternatives will oe measured relative to
these two iicaginery alternatives and scored accordingly.
This option requires the decision maimer to spend more time
developing his measurements in thinking about what consti-
tutes a ten or zero alternative. This means (1) the time
required to develop the measursments for the alternatives
under consideration increases, but (2) the ability to
consider explicit tradeoffs among alternatives also
increases.
As an example, assume for a given attribute that the
three alternatives to be measured are ranked best to worst
as "X", "Y", and " Z " . "X" alternative is the best, and
suppose "Y" is rated 80% as good as "X", and "Z" is rated
50% as good as "X". Using the two fixed end procedure, "X"
would measure ten, "Z" would measure zero, and "Y" wculd be
measured relative to "X" and "Z", say six. The value given
to "Z", zero, indicates that "Z" contributes nothing to the
attribute being considered. This may not be a good measure-
ment because "Z" was assumed to be 50"? as good as "X", and
may actually contribute some positive utility toward the
attribute. If this attribute was the only attribute being
considered by the decision maker for this particular
problem, then the procedure provides the decision maker with
more information then he requires to make a decision. The
decision iraker is locking for the best alternative; "X"
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alternarive is tha best alternativs c ^.. ^ his one-attribute
decision, ar.d the utilities given to "Y" and "Z" contribute
nothing to the decision process. The assumption that "Y" is
80% as gcod as "X" and "Z" is 50% as good as "X" means
nothing to the decision ma)cer. But in situations where
there are mere attributes then one, the evaluation that " Z"
as 50^ as gcod as "X" may have effects (or tradeoffs) on the
final cutcome that the decision maker may not recognitze as a
result of using this option. The importance of this impli-
cation will appear in Step 9 when attribute scores are
summed.
Tc continue the example, in the above "X" alternative
was measured ten, "Z" was measured zero and "Y" was measured
six relative to "X" and "Z" . Assume this was for attribute
"A". Now assume for a second attibute, "3", considered
equally as important as the first attribute, the ranking of
the alternatives from best to worst is "Z", "Y", and "X".
"Z" alternative is the best, "Y" alternative is 60% as good
as "Z", and "X" is 20?5 as good as "Z". Using linear scoring
ever the range: worst alternative equal to zero to best
alternative equal to ten, the following totals would be
generated:
"X" II Y" "Z"
attribute "A" 10 6
attribute "3*1 5 10
Total 10 1 1 10
If the decision maker was to select the best alternative on
just these two attributes, using the two fixed end procedure
he would select "Y".
However, considering the same example using the single
fixed end option for scoring. Now the best alternative
equals ten (as above) but the other two alternatives are
given scores (values) linearly proportional to where they
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lie between "best" and practical worthlassness. Assume r be
decision maker decides ihat saying "alternative Q is =>% as
good as best" is equivalent to saying "alternative Q has P%













These new totals indicate that alternative "Z" is best, and
alternative "Y" is second.
It can be seen that the choice of which scoring proce-
dure to use will have implications on the tradeoffs defined
between attributes; tradeoffs the decision maker may not be
aware of. Thus the decision maker by using the -wo fixed
point option has gained speed in making his measuremenrs
decisions, but the rigidi-y of the measuremeni procedure may
provide the decision maker wirh unexpected results. The
measuremenr cprion selec-ed by the decision maker will
depend upon the amount of risk (risk in terms of obtaining
undefined tradeoffs) the decision maker is willing to accept
versus the speed desired to make those measuremenx
decisions.
For the air defense model, the option using one
fixed end point will be used. This option provides some
speed in developing measurements, and some flexibility to
consider the tradeoffs between altsr natives.
Step 9. Calculate utilities for each alternatives.
Simply add up the products of the Step 8 scores
("measurements") multiplied by their respective Step 7
weights, for each alternative. This one number now repre-
sents the ultility of each alternative.
US

step 10. Review the decision for accuracy.
Step 11. Decide. A single alternative is zo be chcssn,
therefore the rule is simple: choose the alternative whose
sum obtained in Step 9 is the largest.
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11. AIR DEFENSE HO DEL
This chapter has thres sections. The first develops a
lisx of attributes. The reference list of attributes can be
used by the air defense battery commander as a guide (or
reference or aid to memory) in developing his list of artri-
butes ("che ones he desires re use in conjunction with the
air defense model). Definitions of the attributes are
provided not to imply that these are the only meanings, but
rather to create an awareness in the user of the need for
establishing a ccmmon definition between himself and the
individuals he will be briefing.
The second secticn presents the working format of the
air defense model. Within this discussion, SMART will be
modified by eliminating some steps. This will be dene to
reduce redundancy and to make the model more accommodating
to the ccmbat situation.
The final section presents an example scenario followed
by a possible solution to the situation.
A. aiB DEFENSE ATTRIBUTES
The collection of attributes presented in this section
was developed by conducting a literature search of current
army air defense documents. The list is not intented to be
restrictive, nor is it presented to the reader as an all
inclusive list. The purpose of the list is to guide the
user of the model and assist the air defense commander in
developing his own list based on his judgment, air defense
experience, and military intuition. Some of the attributes
presented here have been defined in previous chapters; these
definitions will be repeated hare for the convenience of the
U7

reader. Some of the definitions will be expanded tc provide
the reader a fuller and more comprehensive meaning.
1, Mass. Mass, an air defense principle, is -he allo-
cation of a sufficient number of air defense weapons -o the
defense of each priority asset to adequately protect it
against the air threat. This principle applies to all air
defense weapons. It entails the provision of mutual support
or overlapping fire fcetween weapon systems and all-around
defense in depth. Mass seeks to establish a favorable ratio
of defensive weapons to attack aircraft in the protection of
assets that are critical to the supported force. The intent
of mass is to be able to maintain a continuous volume of
fire on any attacking aircraft. The general rule is tc
deploy short-range air defense weapons in platoon-sized
units around the protected asset. The deployment of short-
range weapons in less than platoon strength risks the
sequential or simultaneous neutralization of both the air
defense weapons and the defended asset by aircraft attacking
in number [ Ref . 22].
Obviously, more air defense is always better, and much
more is =ven better still; but to take more must cost some-
thing. The air defense commander is the individual whose
judgment mentally measures the marginal cost of additional
weapons against marginal benefit. The risks of the uncer-
tain environment (combat) he is entering are very real. He
would prefer to hedge his bet with massive quantites of
equipment but the constraints of reality force the
commander tc make trade off decisions between what is recom-
mended by the general rule (the classroom theory) and what
is permissible by the real world. Giving up a little mass
could mean a defense design that is less than perfect
(according to the definition of mass) , but reality requires
the mission to be accomplished. How much of the mass prin-
ciple to include or net to include will be a decision that
is a function of the commander's judgment and experience.
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2. Mix. Mix is the employment of a complementary
family of weapons. The capabilities of one system offset
the limitations of another system ro prevent the air threat.
from defeating any particular weapon system [Ref. 23]. The
mixing of complementary weapon systems gees hand-in-hand
with the principle of mass. By employing a variety of
weapon systems in sufficient mass, air defense complicates
the problem of the enemy who must consider the characteris-
tics of each weapon system in the formulation and execution
of his offensive strategy. The enemy may be able to design
his tactics and technigues to minimize the effects of one
defensive system, but when faced with two or more air
defense weapons, his price of admission into the defended
area rises [Ref. 22].
3. Mobility and maneuverability. Mobilility of the
icilitary force is the capability to move from place to place
while retaining the ability to fulfill its military mission.
Maneuverability of a weapon system is an indication of its
ability to change its position in a tactical situation in
order to secure an advantageous offensive or defensive posi-
tion. Maneuver is the tactical employment of mobility. Air
defense weapons must be mobile on the oattlefield tc apply
the principle of mass and mix. Continual movement of air
defense weapons is required tc provide protection for the
brigade elements, to accommodate changes in missions, and to
enhance the survivability of the air defense weapons in both
the ground and air battle. Mobility will be affected by
environmental factors (e.g. terrain and weather), and
vehicle characteristics (e.g. tractive force, range, speed,
reliability) .
U. Integration. Integration means that the air defense
design must fit into the overall plan of the brigade to be
effective. The best way to define integration is by an
example: the defensive squad of a football team. Consider
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jus- the defensive backs and tackles; ignore the rest cf the
squad. In -his simple example the defensive backs protect
the air and thus prevent the opposing team from moving the
ball. The tackles protect ths ground avenue cf approaches
and thereby prevent the opposing team from moving the ball.
Together as a squad they prevent the opposing team from
moving the ball or scoring. The defensive squad's overall
mission is to stop the opposing offensive; they accomplish
this overall mission by insuring that each individual player
has the ccrrecx understanding of his expected responsibili-
ties that he is to accomplish from the overall plan.
Integrated action is best accomplished by insuring that
subordinate forces have -he correct understanding of their
assigned missions that they are expectad to accomplish in
support cf the overall mission (e.g. air defense units
protect the air over airfield X, and the infantry protects
the ground around airfield X, not airfield Y. Together the
force protects airfield X) . In summary, integration is
individual elements working in unison towards a common goal.
5. Balanced Defense. Balanced defense is a defense
designed to cope with attacks from any direction with
approximately the same volume of fire.
6. Weighted Defense. Weighted defense is a defense
designed to place a greater amount of -he air defense
weapons along expected routes or forced air avenue of
approaches leading into the protected asset area (e.g. an
airfield located in a deep valley which reduces the prob-
ability cf attack frcm some direct:Lons) . Of course,
weighting the defense unavoidably rssults in some degrada-
tion in defense balance, another -rade off decision.
Factors that could influence the air defense commander's
decision include terrain, vegetation, and characteristics of





7. Mutual Support. The principle of mutual support is.
the positioning of each weapon system so tha- its dead zone
(the area in which the weapon cannot engage a target) is
within the engagement capability cf at least one adjacent,
like weapon system. To be mutually supporting, Vulcans*
positions should be separated by no more than 1000 meters,
which is two-thirds maximum effective range of the weapon.
Mutual support for Redeye is 2400 meters, which is 80^ cf
the range at which a target can be positively identified by
an observer with the naked eye.
8. Overlapping Fires. Overlapping fires is the ability
of one weapon's engagement capability to overlap the engage-
ment capability cf an adjacent like weapon.
9. Air Threat. Air threat is that combination of
airplanes, helicopters, weapons, and tactics the enemy is
capable cf employing against the friendly area. For this
attribute a commander may want to consider quantity of air
assets available to the enemy; location of enemy's air bases
and flying time to friendly location; and the training level
of the enemy's pilots.
10. Terrain, Terrain is defined as the physical
features of the earth. The following items will be consid-
ered within this definition: relief (the elevations of the
land surface, such as mountains, and valleys) , drainage
(rivers, streams, lakes, swamps, marshes), surface materials
(soil, mud, rocks), man-made objects (roads, bridges, dams,
cities) , and vegetation. For this attribute a commander may
want to ccnsider how terrain may effect the firing positions
of the weapons (fields of firs, observation); the effects of
terrain on the enemy's avenues of approach (open area, moun-
tains, dense forests); the effects of terrain on resupply
operations, command and control, and security.
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11. Weather. Weather is defined as a condition of the
atmcsphere with respect to heat or cold, wetness or dryr.ess,
clearness cr cloudiness. In this si-uation a commander will
be concerned about the effects of weather on visability. If
a target cannot be seen, it cannot engaged (by SHORAD
weapons)
.
12. Reliability. Reliability is defined as the weapon
system's chance of successful operation for a given applica-
tion (engagement or engagements) for the statad time period.
In this situation the stated time period is the duration of
the mission. Other factors that could be considered here
are: time required fcr system reload, time required to
conduct scheduled maintenance, state of training of the
squads, and availability of repair parts.
13. logistics. Logistics are -hose capabilities having
to dc wi*h procuring, maintaining, and transporting material
and personnel.
14. Defense in depth. Defense in depth is the posi-
tioning of one air defense weapon in front of another. For
example. Redeye are deployed out from the asset 2 to 3 km.
This will usually place Redeye in front of the Vulcans'
positions which are Iccated very close to the asset. The
purpose cf defense in depth is to subject an air threat to
an ever-increasing volume of fire from the moment it is
detected and identified as hostile until it is destroyed.
15. Characteristics of the asset. Characteristics of
the asset are such things as size, shape, hardiness (how
fortified the asset is), and nature of specific targets
within the asset. These characteristics will affect the
defense design and the enemy's method and direction of
attack. For example, a small asset, such as a bridge or
ammunition storage area, will generally require the enemy to
use more accurate delivery techniques. A larger asset, such
as an airfield or a portion of a city, tends to increase the
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number of enemy attack options. The nature of specific
targets within the asset can be described as homcgencus or
bet ercgencus. An example of a homogenous asset is -he divi-
sion Tactical operation center (TOC) . The TOC is made up of
many small, but equally valued elements. An example of a
heterogenous asset is an airfield. The specific targets
include the airstrip, the ccnnrol tower, buildings, and
maintenance area. Each of these elements probably wculd
have different degrees of import-ance -o an unit.
B. THE aiR DEFENSE MODEL
This section will present the structure of the Air
Defense Model. The steps of SMART have been modified for
use for this conrext. Additional explanation is provided
for seme of the steps where major changes have occurred.
In figure 4.1 is an example of the format that will be
completed by the commander working through the steps of the
model.
The first two steps of SMART have been eliminated. The
air defense commander is part of the brigade commander's
special staff, the brigade commander will always be the
person whose utility is being optimized. The purpose of the
decision is selecting equipment for deployment within the
context cf the combat scenario.
Step 1. Identify the relevant attribu tes . At this
point the air defense commander knows the combat scenario,
the brigade commander's ground tactical plan, and the
brigade commander's priority list for air defense. From the
combat scenario and ground tactical plan he knows where he
is going, and who he is fighting; now he needs to conduct a
map reconnaissance to obtain a feel for the terrain at that
location. with this information the air defense commander















Figure 4,1 Air Defsnsa Hodel.
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ara important to -che evaluation of any altarnative for this
scenario. The atTributes are listed in the second column of
Figure 4.1.
Step 2. Rank the at tri but as in order of im£c r t an cj
.
The air defense commander ranks the attributes in order of
importance from mosi: important to least important. The mcs-.
important attribute to this defense is labeled number 1, the
next impcrtant attribute is labeled number 2, and the
process continues until all a-tributes are numbered. If two
a-trifcutes are tied for a particular level of impcr-ance,
they are bc-rh labeled with the same number. For example, if
mass and mix are tied for number four, each is labeled
number fcur, and the next attribute would be labeled number
five, the n<=xt attribute number six, and the least important
attribute number seven (assuming eight attributes and only
one tie). The rank order for the attributes are recorded in
the first column.
Step 3. 5at€ the attri but es in importance, preserving
2s.%.L2§.' '^^ <^^ this, start by assigning the least-important
attritut? a weight of ten. Now consider the next-least-
important attribute. How much more important (if at all,
the model allows for ties) is it than the least-impcrtant
?
Assign this attribute a weight that reflects that ratio.
Continue up the list, checking each set of implied ratios as
each new judgment is made. Thus, if one attribute is
assigned a weight of ten while another is assigned a weight
of 80, it means that the 30 attribute is eight times as
important as the ten attribute, and so on. 3y the time the
last attribute is reached, there will be many checks to
perform to insure that the implied ratios reflect what the
battery commander intended. Typically, battery commanders
will want to revise early judgments to make them consistent
with later ones. Enter the results in the third column.
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step U. Sum the imp ort anc3 weic[hr3, and div ide each of
the attribute weig hs b^ the sum. Enter these results ir. the
fourth cclumn. This is a minor difference from the method
discussed for SMART. For the air defense model the quotient
will not be multiplied by 100. The values for w will be
between and 1, and the sum of the w (j = 1» 2, 3, •»», n
where n is the number of attributes) will equal 1. Using
this method causes the user to work with smaller numbers and
decimals. If the user does net feel comfortable with deci-
mals, then he should use the method explained in Step 7 of
SMART. The choice is arbitrary.
Step 5. I d e nt i f y the a lte rnatives to be evaluated. As
stated in Chapter III, there will be no more than three
alternatives considered. These alternatives could be all
Vulcans, all Redeyes, and/or mixtures of the two. The ques-
tion for each scenario is hew many Vulcans versus hew many
Redeyes versus what lixture or mixtures? The answer rests
with the number of cargo airplanes the air defense commander
anticipates receiving. A tentative number usually can be
obtained from the brigade operations officer, but generally
an air defense ccmmander should have a feel for how many
aircraft he can expect based on past exercises. For plan-
ning purposes an air defense commander can use the following
numbers to assist him in developing an estimate for the
number of weapon systems. A Vulcan squad rigged for a heavy
drop operation (dimensions: 177 inches long by 98 inches
wide by 90 inches high, weighting 5740 pounds) will need .25
of a C-1U1B cargo airplane (4 Vulcan squads can be loaded o
a C-141B) or .50 of a C-130 cargo airplane (2 Vulcan squads
can be loaded on a C-130). A Redeye team rigged for a heavy
drop operation (dimensions: 133 inches by 98 inches by 77
inches, weighting 5690 pounds) will require the same cargo
space as a Vulcan. If an air defense commander expects




units, whsrs each unit is either a Vulcan squad or 3€'i<=ys
tsam
.
Hew does the commander arrive at a ratio of the two
weapons for a mixtur 5-cf-wea?ons alternative? The ccnifnander
uses his judgment based on a preanalysis of the asset being
defended (size of asset, terrain around the asset, avenues
of approach to the asset, enemy air threat) to develop a
ratio. For example: if the defended asset is small (e.g.,
an ammunition storage area) this will be a harder target for
the enemy to locate. In fact, it is probable that the enemy
air may have to fly over the target to Iccats it. In this
situation, the air defense commander may want to position
his air defense close to target. 7ulcans are placed en or
near the defended asset, thus an air defense commander would
want to take more Vulcans when defending small targets. The
ratio used in the analysis would be a subjective decision:
a decision affected by preference, skill, and past assign-
ments. An air defense commander whose past assignments have
been mostly Vulcan related will probably always lean towards
a Vulcan-heavy ratio. On the other hand, an air defense
commander whose past experience was wi-h Sedeyes will feel
more confident with Redeye ana will probably lean towards a
Redeye-heavy ratio.
Step 6. Measure the lo cation of each alternative b «= i n g
SZ^iE^i^^ l2£ each attribute. This is purely a subjective
measurement, and forces the air defense commander to rely
heavily on his experience, judgment, and intuition. To
start, assume a straight line scale for aach attribute
measured from to 10, where is defined as the minimum
value for that attribute, and 10 is defined as the maximum
value. This step is conducted in the same manner as Step 8
of SMART. The air defense commander informally ranks the
alternatives from best to worst. In this discusion the
single fixed option for developing measurements will be
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used. As explained in Chapter III, tha upper end point will
be assigned to the best alternative; the lower end point,,
zero utility, is assigned to an imaginary or theoretical
alternative that contributes (practically) nothing tc the
attribute. The remaining two alternatives are measured
relative re the bast alternative and the imaginary zero
point. Becord these values assigned in column 5a.
The values thus far obtained are raw measuramen-cs of the
location of each alternative for each attribute. Each
measurement will be weighted by multiplying the raw measure-
ment by the normalized weights obtained in Step 4. Record
the weighted value for each alternative in column 5b.
Step 7. Calculate the utility for each alternative.
Simply add up column 5b for each alternative. This total
will represent a subjective measure of effectiveness (:iOE)
for each alternative.
Step 8. Review ^he decision foe accuracy.
Step 9. Decision, Select the alternative with the
highest total score.
C. EXAMPLE
This section presents a discussion of some of the
thought process that might ba involved in the application of
the air defense model. Tha combat scenario and ground
tactical plan are purposely kept simple. The detail
involved in writing them can be found in any good handbook
for Army staff officers (e.g. FM 131-5).
In the example, steps of the air defense model that
involve iteration of the same thought process are presented
only once (e.g.. Step 4) . For the sake of brevity, the




Combar scenario . The unit is in direct support of a
brigade-sized-el'ement which has received notification of a
deployment exercise. The deployment will be to a
Middle-East country having terrain, political, and mili-^ary
characteristics similiar to Iran or Iraq, called Oilland.
The mission of the DEF is to secure the airhead for
follcw-cn elements of a larger contingency force. The
follow-on eleraen-s will star- arriving at Oilland on D+3
(three days after the DRF arrives). The airhead will
consist of two commerical airports located north of the city
Blues. The airports are six miles apart, both capable of
supporting C-141B traffic and about twenty miles inland from
the Persian Gulf. The DRF is to establish control, and
maintain control of the airhead umiil relieved by higher
headquarters. The airhead is very critical to the overall
accomplishment of the mission.
Brigade commander's priorities are: airfield A,
airfield B, and the brigade tactical operation center (TOC) .
The TCC will be located in the area of airfield A.
I5l£ rec cnn a iss ance. General reconnaissance shows the
area to be flat (small changes in relief) with unrestricted
visibility in all directions. The waterways are generally
located in the southern sector of the country. The soil
conditicn appears to be sandy in texture; man-made objects
are restricted to the roads and some two-story buildings
located en the airfields.
Step 1. Identify relevant attributes (column 2). The
air defense commander simply identifies the attributes or
factors that are important to him in the des:.gn of his air
defense for the brigade commander's priority list. The
answer is very much a function of the individual's experi-
ence, preference, and understanding of the overall mission.




characteristics cf the asset
air threat (quan-'-ity, tacxics, ordnance, experience)
terrain (visibility, avenues cf approach, road ne-'.<crks,







Step 2. Rank xhe attributes. The task here is simple:
put the attributes of Step 1 in order of importance to the
air defense design. What factor will affect the decision
more than the other seven? This is a judgmental step and
the final results will probably vary from one air defense
commander tc another. The example air defense commander
selects "characteristics of the asset" as most important.
The DBF commander specified airfield A and airfield 3 as
priority 1 and 2, but the air defense commander realizes
that the airfield is an asset cf many components and each
component may have a different value of importance to the
missicn cf the DRF. Thus his thought process has to do with
the nature (the functional activities or components) and
design (the size and shape) of the airfield. The most
critical part of the airfield to the DRF is the airstrip,
especially the central portion of the runway. If the enemy
is successful in cratering the center of the runway tney
have a high probability of rendering the strip useless to
the DRF. Cratering the center will require the DRF
commander tc expend man-hours to make repairs; cratering the
center could also disrupt the movement time table of the
DRF. The design of most airfields provide natural avenues
cf approach. The avenues may be pronounced enough tc
justify a weighted defense. Even if there are no forced
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avenues of approach due to the terrain, the design cf the
airfield (long axis cf airstrip) increases the probability
of what likely directions the air attack will come from. An
apprcacn down th? major axis cf a long, straigh- target
gives pilots time to align on targeu, means fewer last
minute adjustments, and greater probability of hit.
The size and shape of the airfield make it an easily
identifiable target from the air at night or in the day
time. Other considerations are the other components of the
airports, such as: fcssible fuel storage (POL), buildings,
airplan= parking (a future contingency), control tower, and
aircraft maintenance area (also a future contingency). To
the DRF the airstrip is the most important, but the build-
ings would provide shelter to personnel, equipment, and
supplies. FOL supplies, if captured intact, would provide
for an unexpected windfall in terms cf fuel. Supplies are
very critical for the first 72 hours, and any unexpected
windfall would help. Airplane parking for disabled aircraft
is a future consideration. Location of the TOC is a consid-
eration. A.n air defense commander might also want to find
cut hew important the airports are to the enemy. This
information will give some indication of the weapons he
might expect to be used against him.
Witn the above information the air defense commander
would want to consider his air defense weapons* capabili-
ties. The volume of fire that a Vulcan can put into the air
will have some affect on pilot's concentration. Placing
Vulcans near the central portion of the strip will have
significant impact on enemy air. Vulcans can add much fire
power to night perimeter defense, and if necessary daytime
ground defense. Redeyes would be placed away from the
airfield to get early engagement. Redeyes can be used to
provide a weighted defense, or can be employed to provide
defense in depth. Redeye teams are smaller, easier to hide.
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and .will hav« early effects or. the pilox's ability tc
concentrate. Early Redeye engagements could possibly
disrupt fcrniations, destroy or iamage airplanes som^ of
which might be flown by key individuals, and fores the enemy
into early evasive formations.
The air defense commander would also want to consider
the interrelationships of his other selected attributes tc
this attribute. As was mentioned earlier, the importance of
the airports to the enemy will have some effect on the
weapcns selected to be used by the enemy air threat.
Without further discussion assume the air defense
commander ranks the attributes as follows:
EsUiS Attr ibute
1 characteristics of the asset
2 air threat
3 balanced defense





Step 3. Rat € the attributes in importance. The ratings
are also subjective, and will be different from individual
to individual. The air defense commander in this example
ranked logistics as least important. He rated it with a
score of 10. ?lix and mass were tied for the next position,
and they were evaluated as twice as important as logisitics.
The next attribute, terrain, was determined by the battery
commander tc be twice as important as mix and mass, and it
was rated 40. This rating also implies that terrain was
four times as important as logistics. If the air defense
commander had not agreed with this implied ratio, he could
adjust his rating for terrain until the implied ration did












also Changs xhe establish two-to-cna rat.io for mix arid mass
An air def=nss commander needs to recognize a change in one
rating may require him to re-evaluate all ratios involved.













Step 4. Sum weights and divide each attribute's raw
weight by the sum to get the normalized weight, as shown
above.
Step 5. Identify the alternatives to be evaluated. The
commander has received guidance from the operations officer
that he can expect three C-1U1B. This means 12 Vulcans, or
12 Redeyes, or a mixture of the two. The commander decides
on four Vulcans and eight Redeyes as a mix for alternative
3.
Step 6. Measure the location of each alternative on
each attribute. The first attribute will be explained in
some detail. The rest of the attributes will be given
measures without explanation, as the thought processes are
similar. The first attribute to be considered is the char-
acteristics of the asset. In -he definition of
characteristics of the asset, it was mentioned that the
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nature of the specific targets within nhe assat cculd clas-
sified as homogenous or hat erogenous . The airfield is an
example of a hatsrogenous asse-. The components of the
airfield have different degrees of importance to the DRF,
and require different considerations in developing an air
defense design. For example, as was mentioned in Step 2,
the airstrip is long and narrow, a rarget that is easy to
recognize from a distance, and is probably the most impor-
tant element of the airport to the DR?. As a result of the
size of the airstrip (long and narrow) the enemy can use a
variety of attack options. He can use standoff weapons from
a distance, or he can fly over the target and drop his
weapons. The effectiveness of these options can be reduced
depending on the air defense weapons deployed. The effec-
tiveness of the standoff option can be reduced with the
deployment of Redeye, and the effectiveness of the flyover
can te reduced with the deployment of Vulcan. For this
attribute, the commander decides the mix alternative can
accommodate the demands of this attribute the best, and thus
is scored ten. Vulcan weapon can provide pinpoint coverage
to the central porticn of the strip and still provide some
coverage for the other items (FOL, control tower, etc). The
Vulcan range is limited and therefore the protected asset is
vulnerable tc standoff attacks. Redeye weapons will be
employed away from the asset to provide area coverage. They
cause the pilots to fly lower to avoid Redeye engagements.
Redeye early engagements will give Vulcan gunners early
warning, will attrite some of the hostile threat, and will
generally disrupt the enemy's attack.
"All Vulcans" are rated second best, and the air defense
commander measures this alternative as 7. The Vulcans can
handle the point air defense without much problem; their
weaknesses are range, limited ammunition load, and lack of
armor protection. The enemy air can avoid the Vulcan fire
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by changirig attacic tactics from flyover attacks to standoff
attacks. This means the enemy might lose some accuracy in
delivering his ordnance, but save airplanes.
"All Redeyes" is measured at 5. Redeye can handle the
area coverage without much difficulty; their weaknesses are
the tail-chase nature of the weapon, and vulnerability of
the team to enemy grcund fire.
The remaining attributes are measured as indicated in
Figure 4,2.
Step 7. Calculate utility for each alternative. This
is just simple addition. Add up all the numbers in column
5b for that alternative and record the sum in the total
block. This sum will be the KOE for that alternative.
Step 8. Review. Does cutcome make sense?
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Figure 4.2 Completed Air Defense Format.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
A. CCNCIOSIONS
This thesis has dsveloped a planning aid to bs us9d by
the airborne air defense commander in the development of his
air defense force structure recommendation to the brigade
commander. There were four charac-er isrics nhat this
desired modrl had to have. These were: (1) The model had
to provide a means of organizing -he commander's thoughts.
(2) The model had to include the interaction of the comman-
der's judgment as part of the overall process. (3) The
model had to be adaptive so that all scenarios could be used
with it. (4) The model had to be simple and easy to
understand.
In Chapter III the arguments for having a model versus
intuition were presented. The SMART version of MAUM was
reviewed, and found to be compatible with the four desired
characteristics. In Chapter IV, the SMART version of MAUM
was modified to fit the general combat scenario used by the
air defense commander. The air defense aodel format is
flexible, adaptable, easy to learn and understand, provides
organization, and requires an extensive use of the ccmman-
der ' s judgment. The model also insures, by wcrlcing through
the steps, that a commander will conduct some form of
analytic analysis, and thus gain a better understanding of
the interrelationships of the attributes choosen.
B. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the air defense model be used by
air defense commanders as a planning aid in developing their
recommendations for force structures. The model would be
especially useful for those air defense commanders that are
commanding a unit for the first time. It will provide them
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